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Private food standards, regulatory gaps and plantation 
agriculture: social and environmental (ir)responsibility in the 
Philippine export banana industry 
 
Abstract 
 
The expansion of retailer-led food production standards over recent years has seen 
certification against such standards become a de facto condition of access to 
numerous supply chains. GLOBALG.A.P. standards, in particular, have extended the 
traditional focus of retailer-led standards beyond food safety to include compliance 
points addressing environmental protection and labour welfare. This has stimulated 
considerable research on the implications of standards compliance for small producers. 
However, little attention has been paid either to the relationships between so-called 
private standards and state-based regulatory regimes or to the implications of 
standards compliance for corporate farms, their employees and neighbouring 
communities. This paper examines these relationships and implications in the context 
of plantation banana production in the Philippines, focusing, in particular, on gaps 
that emerge between the ideals of social and environmental responsibility embodied 
in private standards and actual practices of regulation. It finds that while compliance 
with private standards is associated with comparatively favourable treatment of labour, 
deference to poorly enforced national legislation conceals ongoing human rights and 
environmental concerns.  
 
Keywords 
Environmental regulation, GLOBALG.A.P., human rights, Philippines, private 
standards 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In April 2006, three leaders of the Philippine land reform movement were 
assassinated. Among them was Enrico Cabanit, National Secretary of  the National 
Coordination of Autonomous Local Rural People’s Organizations, gunned down in a 
public market in Panabo City, Davao Norte, on 24 April (Franco and Borras, 2007). 
Cabanit had just come from a meeting with officials of the Department of Agrarian 
Reform which had discussed manipulation of land distributions made under the 
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) by the Floirendo family, former 
Marcos cronies and operators of the largest Cavendish banana plantation in the 
Philippines (Franco, 2008). Two years later, another plantation operator, Fresh Del 
Monte Produce Incorporated, was caught illegally transporting 10 tonnes of the 
chemical endosulfan on a passenger ferry which sank near Romblon Province. In 
neither case have those responsible been prosecuted – a situation that critics take as 
evidence of complicity on the part of regulators as opposed to innocence on the part 
of plantation operators (Franco, 2008). Certainly, these were not one-off incidents. 
Evidence of intimidation, violence and corruption, on the one hand, and dangerous 
and illegal chemical use practices, on the other, has been manifest within the 
Philippine plantation industry for some decades (Borras and Franco, 2005). Further, 
neither were these incidents unique to the Philippines. Similar controversies over 
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human rights and environmental practices have dogged the plantation fruit industry in 
Latin America and elsewhere (Shumate and O’Connor, 2010).  
 
Private-sector food standards developed by industry bodies, non-government 
organizations (NGOs) and/or retailers and other buyers have grown rapidly in 
response to the risks posed by these issues (Bain et al., 2013). Increasing requirements 
for businesses at each link in the value chain to certify their activities against detailed 
quality standards are intended to provide some reassurance that threats to the safety 
and sustainability of food products – along with associated threats to the reputations 
and profitability of food retailers and other large buyers – have been identified and 
managed appropriately. With a small number of very large firms dominating food 
retail and trade in most advanced economies, compliance with preferred standards has 
become a de facto condition of access to many export markets (Colen et al., 2012; 
Tennent and Lockie, 2012). Privately-established and regulated quality standards have 
expanded both in scale and in scope as traditional emphases on the cosmetic and 
safety attributes of foods have been supplemented with criteria addressing various 
aspects of environmental and social performance. By 2012, the worlds largest retailer-
led standard for food production, GLOBALG.A.P., boasted 49 retail members and 
over 123,000 certified producers across 111 countries (GLOBALG.A.P., 2013). 
 
A considerable body of literature has emerged interrogating the benefits and 
limitations of standards as tools to improve value chain sustainability (see Seuring 
and Müller, 2008). As Seuring and Gold (2013) point out, achieving sustainability 
often obliges firms to take action that exceeds their own organizational boundaries. 
For retailers and other large buyers, requiring suppliers to comply with minimum 
standards offers a practical strategy through which to take such action. At the same 
time though, the extension of influence implied by standards requirements has led to 
concerns that: (1) existing economic and political inequalities will be amplified due to 
the exclusion from mainstream markets of small enterprises which cannot afford the 
costs of changing practices or certifying against standards; and/or (2) that global 
standards will impose universal production requirements at odds with the local 
ecological and social specificities of sustainable agriculture (see Bain et al., 2013; 
Lockie et al., 2013). Research has demonstrated that while improved livelihood 
outcomes for family and peasant farmers engaging with standards are possible 
(Henson et al., 2010), so too is the replacement of small-scale producers with 
plantation or corporate farms better able to absorb the financial and management costs 
of certification (Hansen and Trifović, 2013; Swinnen and Maertens, 2007).  
 
The fate of small farmers is an important focus of research. However, there are two 
major gaps in the research literature on private food standards that this paper seeks, in 
a small way, to address. First, comparatively few studies have examined the impact of 
private standards on the social and environmental performance of large farms and 
plantations (for exceptions, see Colen et al., 2012; Melo and Wolf, 2005, 2007). 
Second, comparatively few studies examine the relationships between private systems 
of regulation in the food sector and state-based regulation (Lockie et al., 2013). These 
absences are addressed in this paper through an exploration of standards compliance 
and regulatory practices relevant to banana plantations operating on the Philippine 
island of Mindanao. More specifically, the paper investigates: (1) stakeholder 
engagement in regulatory practices including certification against private standards; 
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(2) evidence for compliance (including monitoring and enforcement) with relevant 
regulatory instruments; and (3) interactions and gaps between regulatory instruments. 
 
Before turning to the specifics of this case study the paper will provide some 
background on the emergence of private standards. It will then examine the 
conceptualization of private standards and the relationships between such standards 
and other regulatory instruments and approaches relevant to social and environmental 
performance.  
 
  
2. Global food, global standards 
 
By the mid-1990s, major retailers across many of the world’s advanced economies 
were demanding that food producers and processors develop verifiable quality 
assurance processes (Lockie, 1998; McKenna and Campbell, 2002). At the same time, 
governments were requiring businesses operating in ‘high risk’ food sectors to 
implement safety programs based on Hazard Analysis and Critical ontrol Point 
(HACCP) principles and promoting among farmers, more generally, the use of 
integrated management systems in order to minimize risks associated with farm 
chemical and fertilizer use (Campbell, 2005). Even the so-called ‘alternative’ food 
sector was developing increasingly sophisticated standard-setting and audit processes 
compliant with international agreements established through Codex Alimentarius and 
the International Organization for Standardization; facilitating the increasing 
penetration of mainstream markets by foods labelled organic, biodynamic and fair 
trade (Lockie et al., 2006). Producers thus faced a plethora of options and 
requirements for quality assurance and certification including firm-specific retailer or 
buyer standards, industry-developed codes of practice, quality assurance programs 
and standards, and legislated quality processes and standards. The standards 
embedded in these options took a variety of forms including: (1) prescriptive 
standards requiring the implementation of specific management practices: (2) 
performance or product standards requiring the demonstration of particular quality 
outcomes; and (3) meta-standards requiring the implementation of approved quality 
management systems (see Gunningham, 2009a).  
 
Maintaining certification against multiple standards with often inconsistent 
management and reporting requirements imposes a range of financial and other costs 
on producers and other supply chain actors. Not surprisingly, many question whether 
these costs lead to additional food safety, social or environmental benefits relative to 
certification against one standard and/or compliance with existing government 
regulations (Tennent and Lockie, 2012; Thompson and Lockie, 2012). Further, as the 
reach of buyer-driven private standards has extended, so too has their complexity and 
the compliance costs they impose (Ponte and Gibbon, 2005). The notion of quality 
has expanded from intrinsic product attributes obvious to the consumer such as 
appearance and taste to include less immediately discernable product attributes such 
as food safety, along with a host of what are referred to as credence attributes. These 
may include any quality or value associated by consumers with the product including, 
for example, the environmental, social and animal welfare performance of production 
and distribution chains, the perceived trustworthiness of value chain actors or 
regulators, the authenticity or naturalness of production systems, and so on (Ponte and 
Gibbon, 2005). Some of the aforementioned standards associated with alternative 
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food networks have, of course, a long history of appeal to credence attributes. Where 
certified products use such appeals to attract distinct price premiums producers are 
potentially compensated for additional costs. However, retailer-led standards function, 
for the most part, as business-to-business standards that are not advertised to 
consumers. They are, simply, a cost of doing business that may, or may not, enhance 
profitability through improved market access (Henson et al., 2010). 
 
GLOBALG.A.P., as mentioned above, is particularly interesting in this light due to its 
rapid growth, global reach, and explicit focus on rationalization and harmonization. 
The GLOBALG.A.P., or Good Agricultural Practice, standard grew out of an 
initiative launched in 1997 by the Euro-Retailer Produce Working Group (EUREP) to 
harmonize multiple quality assurance schemes relevant to mainstream farming 
systems (Campbell, 2005). EUREP released its first standard covering fruit and 
vegetable production in 1999. While ostensibly based on HACCP principles of 
identifying and monitoring risks the standard was, in fact, highly prescriptive and 
detailed specific management practices in relation to: (1) food safety and traceability; 
(2) the environment; and (3) worker health, safety and welfare. Additional modules 
were subsequently developed covering other aspects of food production and supply 
chain management and, in 2007, EUREP was renamed GLOBALG.A.P. to reflect its 
growing reach outside Europe (Tennent and Lockie, 2012). The GLOBALG.A.P. 
Certificate, or Integrated Farm Assurance Standard, may now be applied to all 
horticulture, agriculture, livestock and aquaculture activities and producers have the 
voluntary option of including add-on modules that extend requirements in relation to 
social performance and animal welfare. According to GLOBALG.A.P.: 
 
By complying with a single harmonized global standard for safe and 
sustainable food production, producers can demonstrate their commitment 
to Good Agricultural Practice. GLOBALG.A.P. Certification stands for 
food safety, sustainability, social responsibility, traceability, quality 
assurance and reliability. This means wider access to new markets for your 
products and added reassurance for your business partners and consumers 
worldwide (GLOBALG.A.P., 2013: 26). 
 
Regardless of GLOBALG.A.P.’s reach, its actual ability to harmonize standards and 
rationalize costs is limited in at least two key ways.  
 
First, many competing quality assurance programs remain in the market and are likely 
to remain there through their links to other influential supply chain actors, NGOs and 
others. The Rainforest Alliance Sustainable Agriculture Standard (SAS) is 
particularly relevant to this paper due to its uptake by several Philippine banana 
plantations (see Section 4 below). Developed by a network of conservation NGOs in 
the early 1990s, the SAS now covers more than 60,000 farms in over 25 countries 
(Sustainable Agriculture Network, 2010). These include all banana farms owned by 
Chiquita – one of the world’s largest fruit producers, buyers and distributors – and a 
growing number of independent farms supplying Chiquita (Shumate and O’Connor, 
2010). Relative to GLOBALG.A.P., the Rainforest Alliance SAS contains more 
detailed and prescriptive environmental and social requirements but no specific food 
safety and traceability requirements. Environmental components, or ‘principles’, 
include ecosystem conservation, wildlife protection, water conservation, integrated 
crop management, soil management and conservation, and integrated waste 
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management, while social components include fair treatment and good working 
conditions for workers, occupational health and safety, and community relations. 
Rainforest Alliance also functions as a meta-standard, requiring certified farms 
implement social and environmental management systems based on principles of 
continuous improvement.  
 
Second, GLOBALG.A.P.’s capacity for harmonization and rationalization is limited 
by variability in state-based legislative requirements applicable to food production, 
processing and retail. Private sector standards are necessarily brought into interaction 
with other regulatory tools and potentially vary, as a consequence, in their operational 
content, effectiveness and impacts across jurisdictions. It is this relationship between 
ostensibly universal private-sector standards and the regulatory context of the nation-
state with which the next section of this paper is particularly concerned. 
 
 
3. Private standards as regulatory tools 
 
By increasing the visibility of actors’ actions to others in the value chain standards 
enable the maintenance of trust in relationships that are distant or indirect. 
Nevertheless, as Mol (this issue) points out, enhanced visibility or transparency is not 
equally distributed. While producers and processors are subject to increased 
surveillance and regulation by buyers, the reverse is rarely true (see also Mutersbaugh, 
2004). As regulatory tools, standards empower those with capacity to control the 
content of standards and/or to impose demands for certification on others. This is 
generally seen as responsible for something of a realignment of power in the agrifood 
sector from transnational agrichemical, commodity trading and food processing 
businesses to large retailers (Bain et al., 2013). However, a key factor in the rapid 
growth of retailer-led private standards from the early 1990s was the threat that if 
retailers did not do more to protect the integrity and safety of their supply chains then 
governments would force them to do so.1 The UK Food Safety Act 1990, for example, 
established financial and custodial penalties for a variety of acts including those that 
render food injurious to health or which mislead consumers (Aasprong, 2013). To 
defend themselves against such charges in the event of a food safety incident 
businesses must demonstrate ‘due diligence’; that is, that ‘all reasonable care’ has 
been taken to avoid committing an offence (Food Standards Agency, 2009). As 
Lockie et al. (2013) point out, demonstration of due diligence in the management of 
risks associated with well established activities is usually achieved through reference 
to standards and codes of conduct. While legal directives to implement HACCP-based 
safety systems may focus on a small number of ‘high risk’ food sectors, the due 
diligence requirement in food safety legislation makes adoption of such systems 
more-or-less mandatory for any business seeking to reduce its potential liability for 
safety breaches. 
 
                                                        
1
 It does not necessarily follow from the growth of private standards that power as exercised through 
those standards is always centralized and hierarchical. Producers, for example, may use certification 
against multiple standards as a strategy to reduce reliance on one major buyer (Tennent and Lockie, 
2012). In light of evidence that standards-governed value chains are exclusionary (e.g. Schuster and 
Maertens, 2013) the key factor here is producers’ capacity to mobilise resources to pursue one or more 
certifications (Melo and Wolf, 2007). 
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Private food standards have developed and continue to evolve, therefore, through 
interaction with state-based regulatory regimes. HACCP principles function in these 
interactions as meta-standards to guide the evolution of private standards in ways that 
meet the objectives of government agencies. But food safety laws are not the only 
legislative requirements relevant to private food standards. Explicit attention is thus 
paid in the GLOBALG.A.P. standard to additional legal requirements pertaining, 
most particularly, to environmental protection and the rights, occupational health and 
safety of employees. In order to explain the relationship between government and 
private requirements, GLOBALG.A.P.’s Integrated Farm Assurance Version 4 states 
that:  
 
Legislation overrides GLOBALG.A.P. where relevant legislation is more 
demanding. Where there is no legislation (or legislation is not so strict), 
GLOBALG.A.P. provides a minimum acceptable level of compliance. 
Legal compliance of all applicable legislation per se is not a condition for 
certification. The audit carried out by the GLOBALG.A.P. Certification 
Body is not replacing the responsibilities of public compliance agencies to 
enforce legislation (GLOBALG.A.P., 2012: 5; emphasis in original). 
 
The GLOBALG.A.P. standard is thus positioned as subordinate to state legislation 
wherever the requirements of that legislation exceed those of GLOBALG.A.P. In 
practice, this is likely to be often. The majority of GLOBALG.A.P. compliance points 
relevant to worker welfare and the environment impose prescriptive requirements to 
produce risk assessments, plans, procedures, records and training opportunities but 
provide little (with the notable exception of chemical use and storage practices) 
guidance as to the level of performance expected. Businesses wanting a more tangible 
endorsement of social performance may certify against the GLOBALG.A.P. Risk 
Assessment on Social Practice (GRASP) voluntary add-on module. However, GRASP 
Assessments are available only for countries with National Interpretation Guidelines 
specifying relevant legal requirements including national minimum wages, maximum 
working hours, minimum age of employment etc. In other words, all businesses 
certified against GLOBALG.A.P. are expected to comply with all relevant national 
legislation. However, unless they have voluntarily sought certification against the 
add-on GRASP module (and assuming it is available in their country) businesses are 
not formally required to demonstrate their compliance with labour laws. None are 
required to demonstrate compliance with environmental laws. Despite the claim cited 
above that GLOBALG.A.P. certification stands for, among other things, sustainability 
and social responsibility, GLOBALG.A.P.’s actual requirements provide little 
environmental or social transparency. 
 
The Rainforest Alliance Sustainable Agriculture Standard, by contrast, states that 
certified ‘farm’s upper management must demonstrate a commitment to certification 
and to complying with the requirements stipulated in the standard and by law’ 
(Sustainable Agriculture Network, 2010: 17; emphasis added). Further, the standard 
requires that legal provisions pertaining to employees’ pay and conditions must not 
only be observed; they must be communicated to workers. Of 99 criteria in the 
standard, 15 are defined as ‘critical’ and require 100 percent compliance. Conversely, 
certified farms are required to demonstrate only 80 percent compliance across all 
criteria (or 50% against each major principle, such as water conservation), leaving 
some room for non-compliance with applicable laws. 
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Ensuring positive regulatory outcomes, however, is more than a matter of establishing 
and policing what is and is not required of businesses under various legislation and 
standards. Interactions between private standards and state legislation lead to the 
development of what regulatory theorists refer to variously as hybrid, responsive, 
collaborative, networked, smart or co-regulation (see Baldwin and Black, 2008; 
Braithwaite, 2006; Connor and Haines, 2013; Dorbeck-Jung et al., 2010; Gunningham, 
2009a, 2009b; Taylor et al., 2012). According to Braithwaite (2006), multiple levels 
of accountability are required in hybrid public-private systems to counter the risk of 
no one agency actually taking responsibility to ensure positive regulatory outcomes. 
Limited capacity, he argues, among state agencies to monitor or enforce regulations; 
deference in private standards to laws that are not enforced; and/or deference in 
government legislation to standards that are not adequately audited and verified can 
all lead to regulatory failure. Hybrid systems demand, further, that regulators be 
flexible and proactive in response to the behavior of those they seek to influence – 
modifying sanctions and incentives as necessary – and that the targets of regulation 
engage positively, in turn, with regulatory practices (Baldwin and Black, 2008; Black 
and Baldwin, 2010; Braithwaite, 2006). Reflecting these demands, Section 4 of this 
paper will present a case study examining: (1) stakeholder engagement with 
regulatory practices including certification against private standards; (2) evidence for 
compliance (including monitoring and enforcement) with relevant regulatory 
instruments; (3) interactions between regulatory tools and strategies, consistency of 
those tools and strategies, regulatory gaps relevant to policy objectives; and evidence 
of regulatory reflexivity with respect to corrective responses and changes in the 
operating environment. 
 
 
4. Private food standards in the Philippine export banana industry 
 
4.1 Case study site: Mindanao, Southern Philippines 
 
Philippine export fruit production is concentrated on the island of Mindanao. By 2012, 
Mindanao was responsible for approximately 60 percent of total agricultural exports 
from the Philippines at a total value of over US$3 billion (Mindanao Development 
Authority, 2013). While bananas are exported from Mindanao under global brands 
such as Dole, Del Monte, Chiquita and Sumitomo these companies act, in the main, 
only as buyers. The vast majority of export bananas are produced under license to 
multinational fruit companies on plantations operating under one of two basic 
structures: (1) grower cooperatives comprising small farmers granted land under 
either the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) or the Indigenous 
Peoples Rights Act (IPRA); and (2) agribusiness plantations operated by mostly 
Filipino companies. In the latter case, much of the land under the control of 
commercial plantation operators is leased from agrarian reform beneficiaries and 
indigenous peoples. This is taken up again below in Section 4.4. 
 
These land tenure and business arrangements have long historical antecedents and 
remain the focus of considerable conflict and concern. Attempts to colonize the 
Islamized and non-Islamized (or lumad) indigenous peoples of Mindanao through 
periods of Spanish and America occupation of the Philippine Islands from the 16th to 
mid-20th centuries only ever achieved partial success (Federspiel, 1998; Hayase, 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
2004). Nonetheless, military suppression and an acceleration of Christian in-migration 
in the early 20th century ensured Mindanao’s incorporation when the Republic of the 
Philippines was declared in 1946 (Tigno, 2006). Spontaneous migration following 
World War Two was supplemented with government programs to resettle landless 
farmers from Luzon and the Visayas; attempting, in the process, both to defuse 
peasant unrest in source provinces and to neutralize insurgency in Mindanao (Tigno, 
2006). Mindanao, ‘the land of promise’, was treated as an unexploited frontier and its 
inhabitants routinely displaced to establish agricultural colonies and agribusiness 
plantations (Vellema et al., 2011). Resistance to dispossession was not placated but, 
with the assistance of the Philippine state, the plantation economy continued to 
expand.  
 
The ongoing relevance of conflict over land is well illustrated by the incident referred 
to in the opening paragraph of this paper – the 2006 murder of farmworker 
representatives including Enrico Cabanit, former employee of the Floirendo-owned 
WADECOR plantation. During the 1980s, the Floirendo family secured control of 
approximately 8,500 hectares of contiguous land for plantation agriculture in Davao 
del Norte, including the 5,212 hectare DAPECOL Prison Farm. Resident small 
farmers were forcibly evicted in order to consolidate these lands (Borras, 2006a). In 
1988, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program was legislated by the Philippine 
Government but export plantations won a ten year deferment of CARP coverage. 
Toward the end of this period, WADECOR summarily retrenched thousands of 
workers, including Cabanit, and established controlled unions.2 Management was then 
transferred to a separate Floirendo company, TADECO, in 1994 to justify exclusion 
of the retrenched workers from subsequent agrarian reform (Franco, 2008). Despite 
continuing legal and extra-legal harassment workers and former workers continued to 
organize and, in 2001, a portion of the WADECOR property was earmarked for 
redistribution. Implementation, however, of the redistribution, along with 
determination of who was eligible to benefit and apportionment of remaining 
WADECOR land, were delayed by legal action. Inspection of disputed land by the 
Department of Agrarian Reform scheduled for 27–28 April 2006 was pre-empted by 
Cabanit’s assassination on the 24th (Franco and Abinales, 2007). Those lands that 
have been redistributed are subject to a 60 year leaseback arrangement that provides 
worker-beneficiaries with few rights and little additional income (Borras, 2005, 
2006b). DAPECOL lands, meanwhile, have been exempted from agrarian reform and 
the Floirendo’s were able to extend their lease in 2003 at approximately five percent 
of the prevailing market rate (Borras, 2006a).  
 
The Floirendos may have earned a reputation as ‘the most despotic and notorious of 
the country’s domestic banana elite’ (Franco and Abinales, 2007: 319), but 
manipulation of the agrarian reform program, financial coercion, violence, and 
various other forms of state-sanctioned dispossession are by no means confined to 
Floirendo plantations (Borras and Franco, 2005, 2012; Franco, 2008; Vellema et al., 
2011). Land redistributions on Mindanao have largely by-passed those dispossessed 
by plantation agriculture in favour of Christian settler-workers loyal, or subservient to, 
planation operators (Vellema et al., 2011). As Franco and Abinales (2007: 322) point 
                                                        
2
 Approximately 40 percent of the region’s banana workforce was retrenched between 1988 and 1998 
(Borras and Franco, 2005). The intent, according to Borras and Franco (2005: 338) was to rid the 
industry of potential ‘troublemakers’; that is, workers ‘interested in or capable of organizing 
autonomously to claim legal land rights once the deferment period ended’. 
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out, ‘the Philippine state is failing abjectly to fulfill its obligations to respect, protect 
and fulfill the human rights of the rural poor population’. 
 
If there is any one exception to the rule that plantation agriculture has functioned on 
Mindanao as a tool of suppression and internal colonization it is the 1500 hectare La 
Frutera plantation in the Municipality of Datu Paglas, Maguindanao Province. In the 
1980s, Datu Paglas was riven by insurrection, clan conflict (rido) and lawlessness (de 
la Rosa and Abreu, 2003). In 1997, the then mayor, Datu Ibrahim Paglas, leased land 
at below market value to La Frutera (a joint venture involving Chiquita-Unifrutti as 
well as Philippine and Saudi capital), convinced other landholders to lease land, and 
persuaded Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) commanders to withdraw forces 
from the district (International Alert, 2006). Employing over 2000 local workers, 
including many former MILF combatants, the plantation is seen by many as a model 
example of peace-building through development. But it is also seen as an example 
that has not been replicated. Investment in Maguindanao and other predominately 
Muslim provinces remains sluggish and plantation expansion a focus of considerable 
social and political conflict. As the largest plantation certified against the Rainforest 
Alliance standard, La Frutera will be discussed again below. 
 
Fieldwork for this case study was conducted in Mindanao in late 2010. Semi-
structured interviews were held with approximately 30 representatives of government 
agencies, non-government organizations, export banana plantations and cooperatives, 
and private research foundations. In order to protect the anonymity and safety of 
research participants, no information is provided on the sources of data used in this 
paper unless those data are drawn from other publicly available sources. 
 
 
4.2 Stakeholder engagement in regulatory practices 
 
 
In the case of ostensibly private regulation relevant to the Philippine export banana 
industry, buyers make frequent visits to Philippine plantations to communicate 
requirements and audit chemical use practices. However, there was little evidence that, 
to date, they are demanding certification to any standard other than the International 
Organization for Standardization’s generic series on the development of quality 
systems (ISO9000). These demands were consistent with government requirements in 
the Philippines that all export fruit meet stringent chemical residue limits, that 
exporters be accredited by the Bureau of Plant Industry, and that exporters employ 
quality assurance officers. Consequently, virtually all businesses involved in the 
export fruit industry are certified to ISO9000. Any other certifications are undertaken 
in addition to ISO9000, not in place of it.  
 
At the same time, the Philippine government has attempted to encourage producer and 
exporter engagement with more comprehensive private standards. The Philippine 
Bureau of Agricultural and Fisheries Product Standards (BAFPS) was established in 
1997 with responsibility for ‘formulating and enforcing standards of quality in the 
processing, preservation, packaging, labeling, importation, exportation, distribution 
and advertising of fresh and primary agricultural and fisheries products’ (BAFPS, 
2013). The Bureau has developed over 100 product standards in addition to a small 
number of cross-product standards including the Specification for Organic 
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Agriculture (2003) and the Code of Good Agricultural Practices for Fresh Fruits and 
Vegetable Farming (PhilGAP-VF)(2007). The Bureau is also involved in attempts to 
harmonize standards such as the ASEAN GAP Project. Product standards address 
matters such as cosmetic attributes, varieties and maximum pesticide residues. The 
GAP-VF addresses a broader range of issues associated with food safety, the farm 
environment and traceability. While the Bureau has been directed to benchmark 
PhilGAP-VF against GLOBALG.A.P. (Revision of Administrative Order 25), 
PhilGAP-VF is comparatively limited in both scope and detail. For example, 
occupational health and safety and environmental guidelines are included in 
PhilGAP-VF only to the extent that they contribute directly to food safety (e.g. 
contaminated runoff shall not be stored for use in irrigation).  
 
To encourage certification to PhilGAP-VS, the Bureau of Agricultural and Fisheries 
Product Standards has been mandated to meet most costs of inspection and testing on 
behalf of applicants. Despite this, by 2012, only five businesses were certified 
(including one export fruit company, the Floirendo-owned Tagum Agricultural 
Development Company (TADECO)). While multinational buyers have reputedly been 
asking producers to begin ‘alignment’ to GLOBALG.A.P. standards this appears to 
have led to little interest in PhilGAP-VS. One plantation operator, Davao Agricultural 
Ventures Corporation (DAVCO) undertook GLOBALG.A.P. certification in 2009 and 
at least two other plantations certified parts of their operations. On the whole, 
producers and buyers appear to have been monitoring the development of GAP 
standards and to be incorporating GAP requirements within existing quality systems 
in order to pre-empt future market or government demands. They have not been 
engaging with GLOBALG.A.P. proactively or demonstrating any motivation other 
than a readiness to accommodate requests for GLOBALG.A.P. certification should 
they arise. According to third party certifiers active in Mindanao, exporters were more 
actively pursuing accreditation against ISO22000 food safety requirements than 
against GLOBALG.A.P. 
 
The two exceptions to this pattern have been buyers, NGOs and producers involved in 
certified organic banana production and trade3 and the multinational company 
Chiquita which, as detailed above, has been requiring since the 1990s that suppliers 
begin certifying against the Rainforest Alliance Sustainable Agriculture Standard. On 
Mindanao, Chiquita has supported training and certification against the Rainforest 
Alliance standard for a small number of farmer cooperatives. However, beyond La 
Frutera (described in Section 4.1 above) and Mount Kitanglad Agri-Ventures 
(operators of a 600 hectare plantation in Lantapan, Bukidnon) interest in Rainforest 
Alliance and other eco-standards has been limited.  
 
It is certainly the case that certification to Rainforest Alliance standards has imposed 
costs on La Frutera and Mount Kitanglad Agri-Ventures that other plantation 
operators may consider onerous; most notably, the removal of land from banana 
cultivation in order to establish vegetated buffer zones and wildlife habitat. However, 
compliance costs such as these cannot fully explain the more widespread lack of 
interest in Rainforest Alliance certification. To begin, the La Frutera plantation in 
Datu Paglas is reputed to be the most profitable in Mindanao (International Alert, 
                                                        
3
 Although no data are available on certified organic banana exports from Mindanao, interviews with 
industry representatives suggest that supply, currently concentrated among a small number of farmer 
cooperatives, is inadequate to meet demand, 
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2006).4 Further, all plantations are required under Philippine law to secure an 
Environmental Compliance Certificate which requires, among other things, that treed 
buffer zones be maintained between banana plants, waterways and populated areas 
such as houses and public roads. In this respect, Rainforest Alliance standards largely 
replicate state requirements. Additional costs arise, as the next section explains, not 
through certification and legal requirements per se but through compliance with and 
enforcement of those requirements. 
 
 
4.3 Compliance and enforcement 
 
Compliance and enforcement imply a number of capacities on the part of regulators 
and regulatees. Regulators must be able to detect non-compliant behavior, enforce 
penalties or implement other strategies, and evaluate the effectiveness of their actions 
(Baldwin and Black, 2008). Regulatees must understand rules and possess the 
financial and other resources to follow them (Dorbeck-Jung et al., 2010).  
 
Alignment with GLOBALG.A.P. standards required changes in management that 
appeared well within the capacities of export plantations. Many of these changes were 
arguably minor for the large plantations certifying against or ‘aligning’ their practices 
with GLOBALG.A.P. (more latrines were installed, field practices were recorded in a 
slightly different format, etc.). Despite complaints about the cumulative financial 
impact of numerous apparently small changes, these plantations had sophisticated 
internal quality systems and infrastructure including specialist staff charged with 
reconciling and managing multiple certifications. Nevertheless, the particular impact 
of reliance on domestic legislation and regulation as a baseline for certain aspects of 
environmental performance under GLOBALG.A.P. is important to consider here. As 
mentioned above, plantations are required to secure Environmental Compliance 
Certificates which are monitored by a regulatory office within the Department of 
Agriculture. However, as critics of the banana plantations point out, the only 
plantations on Mindanao meeting the buffer zone requirements of Environmental 
Compliance Certificates are those audited and certified independently by Rainforest 
Alliance. On other plantations, bananas clearly are planted immediately adjacent to 
plantation boundaries, roadways, residential areas, schools, waterways etc.  
 
The inability or unwillingness of Philippine regulators to enforce compliance with 
buffer zone regulations raises several issues. First, it begs the question as to whether 
other regulations, such as those concerning wages and working conditions, are 
similarly left unenforced. While officers, for example, of the Department of Labor 
and Employment regularly inspect plantation records they do not necessarily 
interview workers or undertake other investigative activities that might ascertain the 
truthfulness of those records. Second, the lack of compliance and enforcement is not 
likely to be redressed by GLOBALG.A.P. due to the proviso within this standard that, 
while certified businesses are expected to comply with national legislation, they are 
not required to demonstrate that compliance. Third, on a strict financial basis this 
                                                        
4
 The profitability of La Frutera is likely linked to minimum wages for agricultural work which are 
lower in Maguindanao and elsewhere in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao than in other 
major banana growing provinces (232 Philippine Pesos per day in 2012 compared with P291 in Davao 
Region)(DOLE, 2013). The important point here though is that the plantation is able to maintain this 
competitive advantage despite compliance costs associated with Rainforest Alliance certification. 
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places competing standards such as Rainforest Alliance at a distinct disadvantage 
relative to GLOBALG.A.P. and generic quality systems. The requirement in 
Rainforest Alliance standards that compliance with all or most applicable law is 
actually demonstrated has the clear potential to impose significant additional costs on 
certified businesses in countries and sectors where compliance with relevant 
legislation is generally low. This is borne out by Melo and Wolf’s (2005, 2007) 
research in the Ecuadorian banana industry which found that farms certified against 
the Rainforest Alliance Sustainable Agriculture Standard did exhibit a higher level of 
environmental performance and legal compliance (see also Melo and Wolf, 2005, 
2007). In fact, Melo and Wolf (2007: 268) conclude that: 
 
noncertified farms are consistently out of compliance with Ecuadorian 
laws addressing water quality, agrochemical usage and storage, worker 
safety, and waste management. Since only a small percentage of 
Ecuadorian bananas are regulated by certification, the state’s failure to 
enforce existing legal controls is highly significant. 
 
In the absence of buyer pressure or support for certification to standards such as 
Rainforest Alliance it would appear likely that industry trend towards 
GLOBALG.A.P. alignment will do little to encourage legal compliance. 
 
 
4.4 Regulatory interactions and gaps  
 
Regulatory logics and strategies may interact in hybrid systems to improve regulatory 
outcomes (Baldwin and Black, 2008). Conversely, they may generate unexpected 
and/or undesirable outcomes including the emergence of regulatory gaps that allow 
for significant harm to occur over and above that caused by non-compliance. 
Effective regulation therefore requires the constant evaluation and adaptation of 
regulatory strategies by both state and private actors (Gunningham, 2009b).  
 
Enforcement concerns as discussed above notwithstanding, a number of the corporate 
banana plantations on Mindanao appear to offer favorable employment conditions 
relative to other agricultural businesses. Plantations cooperating in this research 
provided workers and their families with housing, education, healthcare, recreation 
and livelihood opportunities over and above cash wages. Plantation employees 
interviewed – from field and packing house workers to senior management – were 
grateful for the opportunities they had been afforded through their employment and 
proud of their personal and collective achievements. The extent to which these 
observations may be generalized is, of course, an open question – as is the matter of 
whether participating plantations were fully compliant with all relevant labour laws. 
Nevertheless, at least two conclusions regarding the interaction of private standards 
and state legislation, and the creation of regulatory gaps, can be drawn. 
 
First, the role of private standards in upholding employment conditions and ensuring 
compliance with legal requirements was negligible. While farms certifying to 
Rainforest Alliance are required to demonstrate compliance with both local labour 
laws and international agreements concerning salaries, freedom of association, 
working hours, child labour etc. this standard was adopted by only two plantations. 
Other plantations cooperating in this research either met or exceeded legal 
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requirements in respect to a number of employment conditions (e.g. housing, 
education and healthcare) while very clearly not complying with a range of other legal 
requirements (e.g. buffer zones around residential areas to limit pesticide exposure). 
 
Second, favourable employment conditions on a number of large plantations obscure 
the legally and morally questionable ways in which land has been acquired and with 
which nearby communities are still treated. The story of the TADECO plantation 
outlined in Section 4.1, for example, is a story of indigenous peoples’ displacement, 
manipulation of agrarian reform processes, high-level corruption and the violent 
suppression of dissent. Similar stories can be told of other plantations and Mindanao 
remains a focus of allegations of national and international land-grabbing (Vellema et 
al., 2011). Farms certified under the Rainforest Alliance standard are required to 
consider their relationship with local communities and to demonstrate that farming is 
undertaken with legitimate land tenure. However, detailed social criteria – as already 
discussed – are absent from the GLOBALG.A.P. Integrated Farm Assurance standard 
and from generic quality standards. Even the voluntary GLOBALG.A.P. GRASP 
module (for which no Philippine National Interpretation Guidelines are yet available) 
deals solely with the rights of employees. In contrast with Rainforest Alliance, the 
rights and interests of local communities and the legitimacy of land tenure simply lie 
outside GLOBALG.A.P. standards and their implicit definition of social 
responsibility.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
International quality standards lend a veneer of harmonization and equivalence to 
what remain highly nationalized systems of regulation and enforcement. Despite 
strong rhetoric concerning the social and environmental responsibility credentials of 
standards like GLOBALG.A.P. there is very little in this standard or in its inspection 
and verification procedures to ensure such goals are met. Social and environmental 
requirements within the GLOBALG.A.P. standard centre largely on the production of 
risk assessments and plans. Requirements to comply with more demanding national 
legislation are effectively meaningless where state monitoring and enforcement is 
weak given that certifying businesses are not actually required to demonstrate legal 
compliance. By claiming to stand for social responsibility while deferring to 
unenforced state regulations, on the one hand, and simply ignoring critical issues such 
as the legitimacy of land tenure, on the other, GLOBALG.A.P. papers over  
significant regulatory failures and gaps. 
 
While Rainforest Alliance standards are less problematic, it is GLOBALG.A.P. 
standards that Philippine state agencies have been directed to promote and against 
which local standards are benchmarked. Even were National Interpretation Guidelines 
for GLOBALG.A.P.’s voluntary GRASP modules available for the Philippines, the 
regulatory gaps identified in this paper would remain unfilled. Plantation banana 
plantations do not, in the main, perform badly in relation to those matters addressed 
by GRASP (worker health, safety and welfare). It is matters related to the long, 
violent and continuing history of conflict over agricultural land use that remain 
conspicuously absent. 
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It is not unreasonable in light of the Philippine experience to ask just how much can 
be expected of standards in relation to complex social and environmental issues? 
Indeed, it could be argued that rationalized systems of monitoring and verification are 
necessarily limited in scope; that they are suited to encouraging and verifying 
compliance with a baseline set of reasonably universal expectations, but that 
consideration of altogether more serious matters of human rights and environmental 
justice belong to other political spheres. To the extent that this is true, however, it 
must be acknowledged that certification to standards such as GLOBALG.A.P. stands 
for a very partial conception of responsibility and sustainability. 
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Highlights 
 
Private standards and state legislation interact to produce regulatory outcomes. 
 
We examine these interactions in the Philippine export banana industry. 
 
Poorly enforced legislation creates regulatory failures and gaps despite standards 
compliance. 
 
Failures and gaps are particularly evident in relation to environment and human 
rights. 
